1
Unlike substantive measures of democracy (e.g., Polity IV and Freedom House), the binary conceptualization of democracy most recently described by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) focuses on one institution-elections-to distinguish between dictatorships and democracies. Using a minimalist measure of democracy rather than a substantive one better allows for the isolation of causal mechanisms (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 73) linking regime type to human rights outcomes. Because I am interested in the effect of parties and judicial institutions on commitment to the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and torture, I cannot distinguish between democracies and dictatorships using a measure of democracy that bases its coding on either of these institutions.
2
The decision to use the sample of dictatorships from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) is also consistent with other work on domestic institutions in dictatorships including Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) and Gandhi (2008) . Most importantly, Vreeland (2008) uses this sample of dictatorships, and I intend my manuscript to speak heavily to that work. Although the temporal domain of my sample is shorter than that of previous work because the CAT was not open for signatories until 1984, the countries included in my sample are the same as those included in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) , Gandhi (2008), and Vreeland (2008) .
3 Countries 1 This includes military dictatorships, civilian dictatorships, and monarchs (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) .
2 Aside from using a minimalist measure of democracy to draw better causal inference, Freedom House measures are often criticized for their lack of replicability because they are coded at least in part based on interpretation of civil liberties and political rights (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) . Similarly, Treier and Jackman (2008) question the "arbitrary" manner in which Polity IV data is aggregated, while Gleditsch and Ward (1997) argue that Polity regime data is not continuous or ordered, but instead categorical.
3 Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) include in their analyses four additional countries as dictatorships that are not included in my sample. These countries are dropped from my analyses because of missing data on other variables. They are Somaliland (1991 Somaliland ( -1996 , Taiwan (1984 Taiwan ( -1995 , Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991 -1995 , and Serbia & Montenegro (1991 . that transition to democracy as coded by Alvarez et al. (1996) , Przeworski et al. (2000) , and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) fall out of my sample of dictatorships; democracies that fail to hold competitive elections as coded by Alvarez et al. (1996) , Przeworski et al. (2000) , and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) reenter the data set. Alvarez et al. (1996) , Przeworski et al. (2000) , and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) . 
Measure of CAT Commitment and Temporal Dependence
In the manuscript, I code CAT commitment as "1" in the year in which a dictatorship ratifies or accedes to the Convention and "1" every year thereafter unless a state removes itself as a party to the CAT. I am not interested in CAT Ratification; instead, I am interested in states being party to the treaty, whether in the first year or in any year thereafter. In this way, my work differs slightly from work seeking to determine the factors that affect initial CAT Ratification. The decision to use a measure in which CAT Commitment is a repeated event also allows me to use a bivariate probit model (BVP) without dropping observations on torture in the years following CAT ratification. But participation in the CAT, following the initial ratification decision, is not independent of participation the previous year. Importantly, Table 2 below shows that my main results for CAT ratification and torture still hold in both the BVP and the independent probit models even after observations of CAT participation after initial ratification decision are dropped. By allowing states to exit the sample when they ratify the CAT, both the BVP and the individual probit model for CAT Commitment take on the characteristics of a hazard or survival model (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) . Although I controlled for temporal dependence using a third order polynomial time counter (Carter and Signorino, 2010) , this only addresses the temporal dependence the strings of 0s (i.e., no CAT Commitment) and not the strings of 1s (i.e., since initial CAT Commitment) in my model. As shown in Table 2 above, my results are robust to dropping observations of subsequent CAT participation. Furthermore, if I use my original measure of CAT Commitment (i.e., where subsequent observations of CAT commitment are coded "1" rather than dropped from the sample) and include a third order polynomial time counter for the strings of 1s rather than for the strings of 0s, my results hold. The first column of Table 3 below shows the results reported in my manuscript (i.e., those that address the temporal dependence of the 0s). The second column of Table 3 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of a third order polynomial time counter to address the temporal dependence of the 1s. 
Measure of Torture
There are several reasons why I dichotomize the trichotomous Cingranelli and Richards (2004) measure of Torture. When possible, CIRI coders are instructed to derive categorical codes for each country-year based upon observed events (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010; Wood and Gibney, 2010) . As a result, CIRI's trichotomous measure of torture is coded "2" in years in which there are no torture allegations against the state, coded "1" in years in which there are 1-49 torture allegations against the state, and coded "0" in years in which there 50 or more allegations of torture against the state. Importantly for my research purposes, CIRI's variable is coded a "1" if there is even a single incident of abuse in a given country-year. For example, if a rogue cop hits a criminal suspect once, it is coded as a "1" for that country-year in CIRI's torture data. Because I do not wish to draw inferences about that type of abuse, I chose to look only at abuse in which there were unquestionably more than 50 torture allegations in a given country-year.
There is also a debate in the literature about whether the decision to commit to an international human rights treaty is related to the decision to engage in human rights violations. Using the dichotomous measure of Systemic Torture allows me to run a bivariate probit model following Powell and Staton (2009) , one of the main pieces of work to which I wish my manuscript to speak.
All ordinal scales, including CIRI's measure of torture, suffer from truncation (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010) . Fortunately, however, truncation in the dependent variable biases inferences toward null findings (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 130) . Consequently, the results presented using my dichotomous measure of Systemic Torture instead of the Cingranelli and Richards (2004) trichotomous measure of Torture results in a more conservative estimate of my results. Although I cannot test the robustness of my results to CIRI's trichotomous measure of Torture using a bivariate probit model, Table 5 shows that my results are robust to using the trichotomous measure in an individual ordered probit model. 1984 Algeria 1984 Senegal 1984 Angola 1984 Seychelles 1984 Azerbaijan 1991 Sierra Leone 1984 -1995 Bahrain 1984 Singapore 1984 Bangladesh 1984 -1989 Somalia 1984 Belarus 1991 South Africa 1984 -1993 Benin 1984 -1990 Sri Lanka 1984 -1988 Bhutan 1984 Sudan 1984 -1985 , 1989 Botswana 1984 Suriname 1984 -1987 , 1990 Brunei Darussalam 1984 Swaziland 1984 Bulgaria 1984 -1989 Syrian Arab Republic 1984 Burkina Faso 1984 Tajikistan 1991 Burundi 1984 -1992 Tanzania 1984 Cambodia 1984 Thailand 1991 Cameroon 1984 Togo 1984 Cape Verde 1984 -1990 Tonga 1984 Central African Republic 1984 -1992 Tunisia 1984 Chad 1984 Turkmenistan 1991 Chile 1984 -1989 U.S.S.R. 1984 -1990 China 1984 Uganda 1985 Comoros 1984 -1988 , 1995 United Arab Emirates 1984 Congo (Republic of) 1984 -1991 Uruguay 1984 Cuba 1984 Uzbekistan 1991 Czechoslovakia 1984 -1988 Vietnam 1984 Djibouti 1984 Western Samoa 1984 Egypt 1984 Yemen Arab Republic (North, Sana) 1984 -1989 Equatorial Guinea 1984 Yemen PDR (South, Aden) 1984 -1989 Eritrea 1993 Yugoslavia 1984 -1990 Ethiopia 1984 Zaire 1984 Fiji 1984 Zambia 1984 -1990 Gabon 1984 Zimbabwe 1984 Gambia 1984 Georgia 1991 Ghana 1984 -1992 Guatemala 1984 -1985 Guinea 1984 Guinea-Bissau 1984 Guyana 1984 -1991 Haiti 1984 -1993 Hungary 1984 -1989 Indonesia 1984 Iran 1984 Iraq 1984 Ivory Coast 1984 Jordan 1984 Kazakhstan 1991 Kenya 1984 Korea (North) 1984 Korea (South) 1984 -1987 Kuwait 1984 Kyrgyz Republic 1991 Laos PDR 1984 Lesotho 1984 -1992 Liberia 1984 Libya 1984 Madagascar 1984 -1992 Malawi 1984 -1993 Malaysia 1984 Maldives 1984 Mali 1984 -1991 Mauritania 1984 Mexico 1984 Moldova 1991 -1995 Mongolia 1984 -1991 Morocco 1984 Mozambique 1984 Myanmar 1984 Nepal 1984 -1990 Niger 1984 -1992 Nigeria 1984 Oman 1984 Pakistan 1984 -1987 Panama 1984 -1988 Paraguay 1984 Peru 1990 Philippines 1984 -1985 Poland 1984 -1988 Qatar 1984 Republic of Yemen 1990 Romania 1984 -1989 Rwanda 1984 
